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Abstract In this article, we introduce a new static analysis for numerical accuracy. We
address the problem of determining the minimal accuracy on the inputs and on
the intermediary results of a program containing floating-point computations
in order to ensure the desired accuracy of the outputs. The main approach is
to combine a forward and backward static analysis, done by abstract interpre-
tation. The backward analysis computes the minimal accuracy needed for the
inputs and intermediary results of the program in order to ensure the desired
accuracy of the results (as specified by the user). In practice, the informa-
tion collected by our analysis may help optimize the formats used to represent
the values stored in the variables of the program or to select the appropriate
sensors. To illustrate our analysis, we have shown a prototype example with
experimental results.
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1. Introduction
Numerical accuracy is a critical point in safe computations when it comes to floating-
point programs. Given a certain accuracy for the inputs of a program, the static
analysis computes a safe approximation of the accuracy on the outputs. This accuracy
depends on the propagation of the errors on the data and on the round-off errors on
the arithmetic operations performed during the execution.
In programs with floating-point computations, it is demanding to have numerical
accuracy in the results. Our approach is to combine a forward and a backward static
analysis, done by abstract interpretation. The forward analysis is a classical approach
where the errors on the inputs and on the results of the intermediary operations are
safely propagated to determine the accuracy of the results. Based on the results of
the forward analysis and on assertions indicating the accuracy required by the user
for the outputs at the end of the execution, the backward analysis will be carried
out. Backward analysis computes the minimal accuracy needed for the inputs and
intermediary results of the program in order to satisfy the assertions made. In order
to refine the results until a fixed-point is reached, the forward analyses and backward
analyses can be applied repeatedly.
Such static analysis are useful in several safety critical contexts. Here we use
our analysis as a general case which can be applied in many of the safety critical
applications. For instance, the explosion of the rocket-Ariane 5 [1], owing to a software
error in the inertial reference system. Specifically, a 64-bit floating-point number was
converted to a 16 bit signed integer which was larger than 32,767, the largest integer
in a 16 bit signed integer, and that lead to the failure. Another instance was Patriot
Missile [15] failed in detecting and intercepting an incoming Iraqi Scud missile and
killing 18 American army men during the Gulf war. The cause of the incident was an
inaccurate calculation of the time due to computer arithmetic errors.
Technically, we use abstract values written [a, b]p where a and b are floating-point
numbers defining an interval and p is an integer giving the accuracy. Intuitively, [a, b]p
is the set of numbers between a and b which have at least p correct digits.
2. Background
Abstract interpretation(AI) [7] is a theory of approximation in the field of semantics-
based program data flow analysis. The program execution is imitated by AI by ab-
stracting the possibles paths/states and then execute the abstraction of the program.
These abstractions are referred as abstract domain. To reach a fixed point, AI uses
ordering on abstract values. Top value represents all possible values and is denoted
as >. Some times it may take many iterations to reach a fixed point, for speeding
up this process AI uses widening operation [4] using the widening operator denoted
as 5.
Interval is considered the basic integer abstract domain. Figure 1 shows the
mapping of integers to the interval abstract domain. The abstract interpretation of
Ea
rly
bi
rd
Forward and backward static analysis for critical numerical accuracy . . . 165
of an integer expression is negative, positive or zero. The abstract domain which is
interval is sign interval. Interval domains represents the minimum and the maximum
number of closed interval. Interval domain is useful in many cases where the program
is usually bounded by some minimum and maximum. Consider a loop, the iterated
variable is initialized to minimum or maximum value at the entry of the loop and
until a maximum or minimum value is reached it is incremented or decremented.
Figure 1. Abstract interpretation: a lattice model for integers
There are many eminent scientists who work in this area. Abstract analysis on
floating-point computations lead to precision loss [14]. Goubault in this paper points
out that a wrong estimate of precision can be very expensive in safety critical applica-
tions. IEEE standard [17] gives the specifications for floating-point numbers. It also
gives a guidelines for floating-point arithmetic. The different aspects of floating-point
programs, the impact of this representation in computer programs and the representa-
tions and rounding errors is discussed in [13]. By showing various examples, Goldberg
concluded that how the computer builders can support floating-point in an efficient
way. Patrick Cousot and Radhia Cousot [5, 6] have concluded that the abstract in-
terpretation provides the theory of approximation related to the automate formal
methods. Titolo et al. [19] have presented a framework of abstract interpretation
for analysis of round-off errors in floating-point programs. A sound approximation is
done for the error accumulated over different floating-point computation path.
3. Related works
Floating-point programs can use abstract domains to set bounds on the ranges of
variables. One of the main work in this area is the tool Fluctuat [10] which quantifies
the round-off errors. For range computations, Gappa tool [11] generates a proof
checkable by interactive theorem prover.
Precimonious [18], a program analysis tool developed by Rubio-Gonzales et al for
tuning the precision of floating-point programs. It recommends a type configuration
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for program variables to improve the performance in floating-point programs. It also
evaluated various numerical programs to show the effectiveness.
FPTuner [3] uses the formal analysis via Symbolic Taylor Expansions, and error
analysis based on interval functions to approach precision. It generates and solves a
quadratically constrained quadratic program to obtain a precision-annotated version
of a given expression.
In the paper [9], Darulova et al presents a programming model where a compila-
tion algorithm that generates a finite-precision implementation that is guaranteed to
meet the desired precision with respect to real numbers.
In our approach, we determine the minimal accuracy required for the inputs to
achieve a certain level of accuracy in precisions in the results and the intermediary
operations.
4. Abstract semantics
4.1. Abstract domain
Let βp be the set of all binary representations of floating-point numbers with mantissa
of length p. Basically an element x ∈ βp is defined by the following representation
x = ±b0.b1b2 . . . bp × 2e
where b0, b1, ...bp is the mantissa, p ∈ N and exponent range of floating-point e ∈
[emin, emax] [17].
Following the IEEE754 Standard [17], in the binary 64 format, we have 52+1
bits of mantissa, emin = −1022 and emax = +1023. Also we define,
β =
⋃
p∈N
βp
where βp is a set of all flo ting-point numbers with different length.
The IEEE754 Standard also defines some rounding modes [17], towards +∞
(rounding up or ceiling), −∞ (rounding down or floor), 0 (directed rounding towards
zero) and to the nearest (if the number falls midway, it is rounded to the nearest
value with an even least significant digit). Consider a normal float value 12.5, the
different rounding modes results as 13.0, 12.0, 12.0, 12.0/13.0(ties to even/ties away
from zero) respectively. Let us write ◦p,+∞, ◦p,−∞, ◦p,0 and ◦p,∼ the rounding func-
tions which round arbitrary numbers to numbers in precision p following the desired
mode. The IEEE754 Standard defines the semantics of the elementary operations by:
x~p,r y = ◦p,r(x ∗ y)
where ~p,r denotes floating-point operations (such as +, −, × or ÷) computed
using the rounding mode r and precision p and where ∗ denotes an exact operation.
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Let Ip be the set of all intervals for floating-point numbers with a specific precision
p. An element i] ∈ Ip, denoted i] = [f1, f2][p], is defined by two floating-point numbers
and a mantissa length p. We have
Ip 3 [f1, f2]p = {f ∈ βp : f1 ≤ f ≤ f2} and I =
⋃
p∈N
Ip.
Our abstract domain is 〈I,v,unionsq,u,⊥I ,>I〉. The elements are ordered by
[a, b]p v [c, d]q ⇐⇒ [a, b] ⊆ [c, d] and p ≤ q
where p and q and precisions of the intervals [a, b] and [c, d] respectively. In other
words, [a, b]p is more precise than [c, d]q if it is a smaller interval with a greater
accuracy.
The least upper bound and greatest lower bound [12] is referred as join (unionsq) and
meet (u) operations and are defined by
[a, b]p unionsq [c, d]q = [◦r,−∞(u), ◦r,+∞(v)]r
with r = min {p, q}, [u, v] = [a, b] ∪ [c, d]
and
[a, b]p u [c, d]q = [u, v]r
with r = max {p, q}, [u, v] = [a, b] ∩ [c, d].
In addition, we have
⊥I = ∅+∞ and >I = [−∞,+∞]0,
where ⊥ is the least element referred as bottom and > is the greatest element referred
as top.
We define α : ℘(β) → I, the abstraction function such as for a set of floating-
point numbers B with different precisions pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we associate a value of I. Let
xmin = min(B), xmax = max(B) and p = min {q : x ∈ B and x ∈ βq} the minimal
precision in B. In other words, we have,
α(B) = [◦p,−∞
(
min(B)
)
, ◦p,+∞
(
max(B)
)
]p
where p = min {q : B ∩ βq 6= ∅}.
(1)
Consider the example, where we take four floating-point numbers 2.25, 2.5, 2.875,
2.890625 with 4, 5, 6 and 7 bits of accuracy, respectively. We have
B = {2.254, 2.55, 2.8756, 2.8906257},
min(B) = 2.25, max(B) = 2.890625 (2)
and
α(B) = [2.25, 3.0]4.
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The minimal accuracy is 4, ◦4,−∞(2.25) = 2.25 and
◦4,+∞(2.890625) = 3.0.
Let γ : I → ℘(β), is the inverse of α and i] = [a, b]p. The concretization function
γ(i]) is defined as:
γ(i]) =
⋃
q≥p
{x ∈ βq : a ≤ x ≤ q}. (3)
Let us consider the following example of equation (2) with floating-point interval with
their binary representation : [2.25, 2.890625]6 Here,
i] = [2.25, 2.891]6
γ(i]) can be represented as,
2.256 → 0 10000000 001000
2.56 → 0 10000000 100000
2.756 → 0 10000000 001100
...
Finally, using the functions of equations (1) and (3), we define the Galois connexion [8]
as:
〈B,⊆,∪,∩,⊥B ,>B〉 −−−→←−−−α
γ 〈I,v,unionsq,u,⊥I ,>I〉. (4)
4.2. Transfer functions
In this section, we introduce the rules that compute the precision of the nodes in a
computation tree. Every program we write can be represented as control flow diagram
(CFG) which depicts the program point and the state of the variables in the program
at each control point. Using the CFG we can analyze the static behaviour of the
program. Each control point can be considered as a node. There can be forward
analysis or backward analysis or both can be done on the CFG. If we take a program
point p, in a forward analysis taking into account the nodes which were preceding
we can conclude the behaviour of the node at program point p. And in backward
analysis we try to reason the facts from p to reach successors. There are two classes of
transfer functions. We use the first for forward analysis and the second for backward
analysis. For each class, we give the transfer function for the two basic operations:
addition and multiplication.
4.2.1. Transfer functions for forward analysis
A forward analysis is one that for each program point computes information about
the past behavior.
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Transfer Function for addition in forward analysis: Consider the addition of two
intervals x = [a, b]p1 and y = [c, d]p2 with a = s1·m1·2e1 , b = s′1·m′1·2e
′
1 , c = s2·m2·2e2
and d = s′2 ·m′2 · 2e
′
2 .
In the forward analysis, in order to estimate the precision for the result z = x+y
we take different cases. Let d = e2 − e1.
p =

min(p1, p2), if e1 = e2,
min(p1 − 1, p2 + d− 1), if e1 > e2,
min(p1 + d− 1, p2), if e1 < e2.
Transfer function for multiplication in forward analysis: Consider the multiplication
of two intervals x = [a, b]p1 and y = [c, d]p2 with a = s1 ·m1 · 2e1 , b = s′1 ·m′1 · 2e
′
1 ,
c = s2 ·m2 ·2e2 and d = s′2 ·m′2 ·2e
′
2 . The resultant zp′ whose precision p
′ is estimated
as
p′ =
{
min(p1, p2)− 1, for all e1e2 cases
4.2.2. Transfer functions for backward analysis
A backward analysis is one that for each program point computes information about
the future behavior. Here, the addition and multiplication transfer functions will be
the same as that of the forward analysis. Only the computations are done in the
reverse order and we come to the minimal accuracy that is required for the inputs to
achieve an asserted precision for the final result.
Units in first place: In the numerical analysis, the accuracy of a result is sometimes
measured by the ”unit in the last place (ulp)”. Sometimes delicate error estimations
in the ulp-concept have the drawback that it depends on the floating-point format
and needs extra care in the underflow range [16]. So we use ”unit in the first place”
(ufp) or leading bit of a real number by
0 6= r ∈ R ⇒ ufp(r) = 2log2brc.
Consider xp and yq, where x and y are two floating-point numbers with p and q
precision accuracy respectively. While adding we get result rpr as follows,
rpr = xp + yq.
Let x and y be the error in the float-number x and y respectively. That is,
x ≤ 2i−p and y ≤ 2j−q.
where i = ufp(x) and j = ufp(y). We can find the error in result as,
r = x + y.
Ea
rly
bi
rd
170 MG Thushara, K Somasundaram
Precision of the the result can be obtained as (see Fig. 2)
pr = ufp(r)− ufp(r)
Figure 2. Precision of the result mapped using ufp
We take the same operands xp and yq to get the product rpr. That is,
rpr = xp × yq. (5)
The error of x and y is represented as x and y and the resultant error is calculated
as r. Here we calculate the error in the result as,
r = (x × y) + (y × x) + (x y).
The precision in the result can be calculated as (see Figure.2)
pr = ufp(r)− ufp(r).
Using the result and one of the operands of the addition in forward analysis, we
do backward analysis and get the other operand. So we will take the operand(yq) and
result(rpr) from Equation (5) to reach xp as follows,
xp = rpr − yq
The error and ufp can be calculated as follows,
½ ufp(x) ≤ x ≤ ufp(x) (6)
½ ufp(y) ≤ y ≤ ufp(y). (7)
Combining the equations (6) and (7) and also referring to equation (5), we get
½ ufp(x) + ½ ufp(y) ≤ r ≤ ufp(x) + ufp(y). (8)
We consider the left side of the equation (8),
½ ufp(x) ≤ r − ½ ufp(y)
ufp(x) ≤ 2 r − ufp(y).
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As we did backward analysis with addition using the result and one of the operands
of the addition in forward analysis, we are going to do backward analysis on multipli-
cation. We will use the result (rpr) and operand (yq) from equation-(2) to reach xp.
We consider y ≥ 0.
xp = rpr ÷ yq. (9)
Using the ufp error in equation (9), we get
½ ufp(x) y ≤ x y ≤ ufp(x) y (10)
½ ufp(y) x ≤ y x ≤ ufp(y) x. (11)
Combining equations (10) and (11), we get
¼ ufp(x) ufp(y) ≤ x y ≤ ufp(x) ufp(y)
½ ufp(x) y + ½ ufp(y) x ≤ ¼ ufp(x) ufp(y) ≤ r
2 ufp(x) y + ufp(x) ufp(y) ≤ 4 r − ufp(y) x
ufp(x) ≤ 4 r − ufp(y) x
2 y ufp(y)
.
5. A Running Example
(0) a = 0.0; c = 0.25; t = 0;
(1) Assert x[t] = [0, 1]32 for all t;
while (t < t_max)
{
(2) a = a * a;
(3) a = a * c;
(4) a = a + x[t];
t++; (5)
}
(6) y = 1.5 * a + 1.0;
(7) Assert y = ⊥16;
(8) End
Figure 3. Code snippet
In this section, we are going to show how our forward and backward static analyses
work on a sample code snippet, given in Figure 3. In general, a forward analysis
computes information from the beginning to the end of the program and a backward
analysis computes information from the end of the program to the beginning. In order
to take advantage of the backward analysis, we consider that the desired accuracy (the
number of correct bits) is specified by the user at the end of the program. So, we
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introduce an assertion at control-point (7), stating that, at this point, y belongs to
an unknown interval with 16 bits of accuracy.
We consider abstract values [a, b]p for the static code analysis. Let Fp be the set
of all floating-point numbers with accuracy p. Intuitively,
a ∈ [a, b]p ⇔ a ∈ Fp : a ≤ x ≤ b.
For example, in the code snippet of Figure 3, the assertion at control point (7) is
written y = [−∞,+∞]16. By extension, F∞ denotes the set of exact numbers, i.e.
the numbers with an infinite number of correct digits. Figures 4 and 5 show the detail
of forward and backward analysis respectively.
(2) a = [0.0, 0.0]53 × [0.0, 0.0]53 = [0.0, 0.0]53
(3) a = [0.0, 0.0]53 × [0.25, 0.25]53 = [0.0, 0.0]53
(4) a = [0.0, 0.0]53 + [0.0, 1.0]32 = [0.0, 1.0]32
(5) a = [0.0, 0.0]53 ∪ [0.0, 1.0]32 = [0.0, 1.0]32
(2)’ a = [0.0, 1.0]32 × [0.0, 1.0]32 = [0.0, 1.0]31
(3)’ a = [0.0, 1.0]31 × [0.25, 0.25]53 = [0.0, 0.25]31
(4)’ a = [0.0, 0.25]31 + [0.0, 1.0]32 = [0.0, 1.25]32
(5)’ a = [0.0, 1.0]32 ∪ [0.0, 1.25]32 = [0.0, 1.25]32
(2)’’ a = [0.0, 1.25]32 × [0.0, 1.25]32 = [0.0, 1.5625]31
(3)’’ a = [0.0, 1.5625]31 × [0.25, 0.25]53 = [0.0, 0.390625]31
(4)’’ a = [0.0, 0.390625]31 + [0.0, 1.0]32 = [0.0, 1.390625]32
(5)’’ a = [0.0, 1.25]32 5 [0.0, 1.390625]32 = [0.0, 2.0]32
(2)’’’ a = [0.0, 2.0]32 × [0.0, 2.0]32 = [0.0, 4.0]31
(3)’’’ a = [0.0, 4.0]31 × [0.25, 0.25]53 = [0.0, 1.0]31
(4)’’’ a = [0.0, 1.0]31 + [0.0, 1.0]32 = [0.0, 2.0]32
(5)’’’ a = [0.0, 2.0]32
(6) y = [1.5, 1.5]53 × [0.0, 2.0]32 + [1.0, 1.0]53
= [0.0, 3.0]32 + [1.0, 1.0]53 = [1.0, 4.0]33
Figure 4. forward analysis using the code snippet.
Forward analysis We start with the forward analysis, given in Figure 4. First, a is
the input variable and c is a floating-point constant. By default we assume that they
have 53 digits of accuracy as for the Binary64 format [16]. At control point (1), an
assertion states that all the elements of the array x[t] belongs to the interval [0.0, 1.0]
and have accuracy 32. In practice, x[t] could be a sensor with a limited accuracy
or a sequence of values computed by another procedure with a limited accuracy. At
control points (2) and (3) x is multiplied by itself and then by c. At the first iteration,
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(-7) y = [1.0, 4.0]33 ∪ ⊥16 = [1.0, 4.0]16
(-7) c = [0.25, 0.25]53
(-6) a = (([1.5, 1.5])−1)× ([1.0, 4.0]16 − [1.0, 1.0]53)
= [0.0, 2.0]15
(-5) a = [0.0, 2.0]32 ∩ [0.0, 2.0]15 = [0.0, 2.0]15
(-5) c = [0.25, 0.25]53
(-4) a = [0.0, 2.0]15
(
+ [0.0, 1.0]32)
)−1
= [0.0, 1.0]14
(-4) x[t] = [0.0, 2.0]15
(
+ [0.0, 1.0]14
)−1
= [0.0, 1.0]15
(-3) a = [0.0, 1.0]14
(× [0.0, 0.25]53)−1 = [0.0, 4.0]14
(-3) c = [0.0, 1.0]14
(× [0.0, 4.0]14)−1 = [0.0, 0.25]15
(-2) a = [0.0, 4.0]14
(× [0.0, 2.0]32)−1 = [0.0, 2.0]14
(-2) a = [0.0, 4.0]14
(× [0.0, 2.0]14)−1 = [0.0, 2.0]15
(-5)’ a = [0.0, 2.0]15 ∪ [0.0, 2.0]15 = [0.0, 2.0]15
(-5)’ a = [0.25, 0.25]53 ∪ [0.25, 0.25]15 = [0.25, 0.25]15
(-5)’ x[t] = [0.0, 1.0]32 ∪ [0.0, 1.0]15 = [0.0, 1.0]15
(-4)’ a = [0.0, 2.0]15
(
+ [0.0, 1.0]15)
)−1
= [0.0, 1.0]14
(-4)’ x[t] = [0.0, 2.0]15
(
+ [0.0, 1.0]14
)−1
= [0.0, 1.0]15
(-3)’ a = [0.0, 1.0]14
(× [0.0, 0.25]15)−1 = [0.0, 4.0]14
(-3)’ c = [0.0, 1.0]14
(× [0.0, 4.0]15)−1 = [0.0, 0.25]15
(-2)’ a = [0.0, 4.0]14
(× [0.0, 2.0]15)−1 = [0.0, 2.0]14
(-2)’ a = [0.0, 4.0]15
(× [0.0, 2.0]15)−1 = [0.0, 2.0]15
(-1) a = [0.0, 2.0]15
(-1) c = [0.0, 0.25]15
(-1) x[t] = [0.0, 1.0]15
Figure 5. backward analysis using the code snippet
this lets a unchanged, since a = [0.0, 0.0]53. Next, at point (4), a is incremented by
x[t] which results in the value [0.0, 0.0]53 + [0.0, 1.0]32 = [0.0, 1.0]32.
After execution of the first iteration, the control-flow comes back to point (2),
at the second iteration of the loop, denoted point (2)′ in Figure 4. As usually in
abstract interpretation, in order to over-approximate the whole concrete executions
of the code, at point (2)′, the value given to a is the join of a at points (2) and
(4). The second iteration is then executed, a is squared, multiplied by c and finally
incremented by x[t], yielding [0.0, 1.25]32. After the addition, the new value of a has
one more correct digit than the former. If a ∈ [0.0, 1.0]32 then a has 32 correct digits
and the error between a and the exact value a that it represents is bounded by
|a− a| < 2−32
and the error on a×c is bounded by 2−33. Figure 4 shows one more iteration, starting
at point (2)′′ and terminating at point (4)′′.
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Here, we observe that iterations may keep continuing, so at control point (2)′′′,
we do an over-approximation using a widening operation. In the theory of abstract in-
terpretation [6], the widening operators over-approximate over the abstract iterations.
The chain of abstract iterations can go potentially forever. To enforce termination
to this iteration we use a widening operator denoted 5 by [5]. Widening/Narrow-
ing approach can improve the precision and the speed of convergence of the analysis
significantly. We use a staged widening which returns the next power of 2 when the
bounds of the intervals are increasing. This over-approximates a with the value [0, 2]32
at control point (2)′′′. Then, one more iteration is run and a fixed-point is reached.
Finally, the abstract value of y is evaluated at point (6).
Backward Analysis: Backward analysis we start from control point (7) in a backward
flow denoted (−7) in Figure 5 in order to indicate that we are in the backward
phase, we benefit from the assertion y = ⊥16 and start from the result of the forward
analysis which is y = [1.0, 4.0]33. The join of both predicates yields the other operand
y = [1.0, 4.0]33 ∪ ⊥16 = [1.0, 4.0]16. Next, at point (6), the statement y = 1.5× a + 1
is is evaluated backward as a = 1.5−1 × y− 1, yielding a = [0.0, 2.0]15. At control
point(-4) and (-4)’, the transfer function for addition will be used with the case e1 > e2
and the case e1 < e2 respectively. At control points (-3) and (-3)’, the multiplication
transfer function is used.
After two iterations of the backward analysis, a fixed-point is reached. As a
final result, we have inferred that in order to obtain a result y with 16 correct bits,
the input a must have at least 15 correct bits at the beginning of the execution. In
addition, c and the elements of the array a must also have at least 15 correct bits.
This information is obtained by combining the forward and backward analyses.
A simple forward analysis could only infer this property by successive tries, by as-
signing iteratively arbitrary accuracies to a, c and x at the beginning of the code and
by observing the results until the desired accuracy on the result is observed. Thus
Backward analysis helps in finding the minimal accuracy required for the inputs to
get the desired accuracy for the output.
6. Conclusions
The static analysis helps to identify and taking necessary steps in avoiding different
flaws that can happen in computations with floating-point values. In this paper, we
are addressing one of the open areas in the field of static analysis in safety critical prob-
lems to decide on the minimal accuracy required in inputs for achieving the desired
accuracy in outputs. We have presented a combined forward and backward analysis
of floating- point programs. An abstract domain for intervals with floating-point val-
ues has been defined and the transfer functions for basic mathematical operations like
addition and multiplication are also defined. As future work, we will be extending the
analysis for other mathematical operations like division and bisection of floating-point
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intervals. Also a prototype for demonstrating the abstraction and concretization on
the domain is being implemented.
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